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Economists are often puzzled by the stronger public opposition to immigration than trade,
since the two policies have symmetric effects on wages. Unlike trade, however, immigration
changes the composition of the local population, imposing potential externalities on natives.
While previous studies have focused on fiscal spillovers, a broader class of externalities arise
because people value the ‘compositional amenities’ associated with the characteristics of
their neighbors and co-workers. In this paper we present a new method for quantifying the
relative importance of these amenities in shaping attitudes toward immigration. We use data
for 21 countries in the 2002 European Social Survey, which included a series of questions on
the economic and social impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing
or reducing immigrant inflows. We find that individual attitudes toward immigration policy
reflect a combination of concerns over conventional economic impacts (i.e., on wages and
taxes) and compositional amenities, with substantially more weight on composition effects.
Most of the difference in attitudes to immigration between more and less educated natives is
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Economists are often puzzled by the stronger public opposition to immigration than trade, 
since the two policies have symmetric effects on wages.  Unlike trade, however, 
immigration changes the composition of the local population, imposing potential 
externalities on natives.  While previous studies have focused on fiscal spillovers, a 
broader class of externalities arise because people value the ‘compositional amenities’ 
associated with the characteristics of their neighbors and co-workers.  In this paper we 
present a new method for quantifying the relative importance of these amenities in 
shaping attitudes toward immigration.  We use data for 21 countries in the 2002 
European Social Survey, which included a series of questions on the economic and social 
impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing or reducing immigrant 
inflows. We find that individual attitudes toward immigration policy reflect a 
combination of concerns over conventional economic impacts (i.e., on wages and taxes) 
and compositional amenities, with substantially more weight on composition effects.  
Most of the difference in attitudes to immigration between more and less educated 
natives is attributable to heightened concerns over compositional amenities among the 
less-educated.   
 
 
*We are extremely grateful to the European Social Survey questionnaire design team for 
their assistance in the design of the questions included in the 2002 ESS Survey, and to the 
Nuffield Foundation, the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), and 
the Center for Labor Economics at Berkeley for financial support. We also thank Maria 
Demousis for research assistance.Standard economic reasoning suggests that immigration, like trade, creates a 
surplus that in principle can be redistributed so all natives are better off (Mundell, 1957).   
In practice the redistributive mechanisms are incomplete so both policies tend to create 
winners and losers.  Even so, public support for increased immigration is far weaker than 
for expanding trade.
1  While the two policies have symmetric effects on relative factor 
prices, immigration also changes the composition of the receiving country’s population, 
imposing externalities on the existing population.  Previous studies have focused on the 
fiscal externalities created by redistributive taxes and benefits (e.g., MaCurdy, Nechyba, 
and Bhattacharya, 1998; Borjas, 1999, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter, 2007).  A wider 
class of externalities arise through the fact that people value the ‘compositional 
amenities’ associated with the characteristics of their neighbors and co-workers.  Such 
preferences are central to understanding discrimination (Becker, 1957) and choices 
between neighborhoods and schools (e.g., Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007) and 
arguably play an important role in mediating views about immigration. 
  This paper presents a new method for quantifying the relative importance of 
compositional amenities in shaping individual attitudes toward immigration.  The key to 
our approach is a series of questions included in the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS) 
that elicited views on the effects of immigration on specific domains – including impacts 
on relative wages and the fiscal balance, and a country’s culture life – as well as on the 
importance of maintaining shared religious beliefs, language, and customs.  We use a 
latent-factor approach to combine these questions into two factors: one representing 
concerns over wages, taxes and benefits; and another representing concerns over 
                                                 
1 For example, a recent international opinion poll conducted by the Pew Foundation (Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, 2007) found uniformly more positive views for free trade than for immigration.  Mayda (2008) 
documents the same divergence using data from the International Social Survey Program.    2 
 
compositional amenities. We then relate views on immigration policy, and overall 
assessments about the effect of immigration on the economy and the quality of life, to 
these latent factors.  Our method yields a simple decomposition of the differences in 
opinions between demographic groups (e.g., more and less educated worker) into 
differences in the two types of concerns. 
  Our empirical analysis leads to three main conclusions.  First, we find that 
attitudes to immigration – expressed by the answer to a question of whether more or 
fewer immigrants from certain source countries should be permitted to enter, for example 
– reflect a combination of concerns over compositional amenities and the direct economic 
impacts of immigration on wages and taxes.  Second, we find that the strength of the 
concerns that people express over the two channels are positively correlated.  This means 
that studies that focus exclusively on one factor or the other capture a reasonable share of 
the variation in attitudes for or against increased immigration.
2 
Our third conclusion is that concerns over compositional amenities are 
substantially more important than concerns over the impacts on wages and taxes.
3  
Specifically, variation in concerns over compositional amenities explain 3-5 times more 
of the individual-specific variation in answers to the question of whether more or fewer 
immigrants should be permitted to enter than does variation in concerns over wages and 
taxes.  Concerns over compositional amenities are even more important in understanding 
attitudes toward immigrant groups that are ethnically different, or come from poorer 
                                                 
2 Some previous studies of attitudes toward immigration have ignored compositional amenity effects (e.g., 
Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) while others have focused on “non-economic” explanations for anti-
immigrant attitudes (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996).  An exception is Mayda (2006), who focuses on 
both economic and non-economic factors.  We interpret concerns over racial and cultural homogeneity – 
which are sometimes interpreted as “non-economic” factors – as expressing the importance of 
compositional amenities. 
3 A similar conclusion is reached by Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997) using data for the U.S. and by 
Dustmann and Preston (2007) using data for the U.K.       3 
 
countries.  Similarly, differences in concerns over compositional amenities account for 
about 70% of the gap between high- and low-education respondents over whether more 
immigrants should be permitted to enter the country.  
Interestingly, concerns over the direct economic impacts of immigration explain a 
much larger share of variation in responses to a summary question of whether 
immigration is good or bad for the economy.  The contrast suggests that respondents 
make a distinction between the wage and tax effects of immigration and the effects on the 
composition of the host country, and place substantial weight on the latter in forming 
overall views about immigration policies. 
  The next section of the paper describes our methodology for evaluating the 
relative importance of concerns over direct economic impacts and compositional 
amenities in shaping attitudes toward immigration.  We describe our basic factor model 
and the assumptions we use to identify the model using the questions in the ESS.  Section 
III gives a brief overview of the ESS and the patterns of responses to the key questions 
about immigration in the survey.  Section IV presents our main empirical findings, while 
Section V presents a series of extensions and robustness checks.  We summarize our 
main conclusions in Section VI. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework and Estimation Methodology 
a. Basic Framework 
  Assume that a given individual (indexed by i) evaluates alternative policy 
scenarios though an indirect utility function that depends on his or her net income and on 
the characteristics of his or her community:    4 
 
 u i( wi  +  bi − ti ,  ai ) , 
where wi represents individual i’s gross income, bi and ti  represent transfer benefits and 
taxes, respectively, and ai is a (multi-dimensional) summary of the characteristics of i’s 
community, including such features as the racial composition and religious affiliation of 
i’s neighborhood and workplace, and the mean income and poverty rate of i’s neighbors.  
When asked to decide whether immigration should be increased or reduced, we 
assume that the individual compares a hypothetical environment in the presence of more 
or less immigrants (wi′, bi′, ti′, ai′) to the current situation (wiº, biº, tiº, aiº) and reports a 
transformation of the difference in indirect utilities:  
 y i  =  gi  [ ui(wi′ + bi′ − ti′ , ai′)  −   ui(wiº + biº − tiº, aiº) ] , 
where gi is a person-specific response function (assumed to be monotonically increasing).  
Taking a first order approximation, and allowing for an additive effect from a vector of 
covariates (Xi), the observed response of individual i is: 
(1)   yi  ≈   λ1i ( ∆wi + ∆bi − ∆ti )  +  λ2i ∆ai  +  αXi  +  µi 
where ∆wi = wi′ − wiº is the difference in gross earnings between the alternative 
scenarios, ∆bi, ∆ti and ∆ai  are the corresponding differences in benefits, taxes, and 
compositional amenities, respectively, and µi is an approximating error. Defining λ1 = 
E[λ1i] and λ2 = E[λ2i], equation (1) can be rewritten as 
(2) yi   =    λ1 f1i   +   λ2 f2i  +   αXi  +  µi 
where 
 f 1i  ≡  [λ1i/λ1] × ( ∆wi + ∆bi − ∆ti )    and 
 f 2i  ≡  [λ2i/λ2] × ∆ai  .    5 
 
The individual-specific variables f1i and f2i represent the relative intensities of individual 
i’s concerns over the direct economic effect and the compositional amenity effect of the 
change, respectively.  Note that f1i and f2i incorporate both the magnitudes of the changes 
envisioned by the individual (reflected in ∆wi, ∆bi, ∆ti, ∆ai), and the relative importance 
of the changes (reflected in λ1i/λ1 and λ2i/λ2).
4  An individual may express stronger 
concerns about the wage impacts of immigration, for example,  because she projects a 
larger wage loss as a result of the policy, or because she has a higher marginal utility of 
income, or because she interprets the response scale differently (i.e., has a steeper gi 
function). 
  We do not observe f1i and f2i directly. Instead, we observe responses to a series of 
questions that provide information about an individual’s realizations of f1i and f2i.  
Specifically, we assume that the intensity of concern about direct economic effects of 
immigration is reflected in answers to five questions:
5  
i.   Do you agree or disagree that wages and salaries are brought down by immigration? 
ii   Do you agree or disagree that immigrants harm the economic prospects of the poor? 
iii. Do you agree or disagree that immigrants help to fill jobs where there are shortages 
     of workers? 
iv. Would you say that immigrants generally take jobs away from natives or help create 
 new jobs? 
v.  On balance do you think that immigrants take out more (in health benfefits and  
     welfare services) than they put in (in taxes)? 
 
                                                 
4 From (1), λ1i = gi′ × ∂ui/∂wi and λ2i = gi′ × ∂ui/∂ai.  Thus variation in λji/λj reflects variation in the way that 
different individuals interpret the response scale used to measure their policy views, as well as in the 
marginal utilities of wages and amenities.  
5 The economic impact questions in the ESS elicit respondents’ views about the effects of immigration on 
wages and job opportunities in general, rather than about impacts on their own situation.  This wording 
choice was influenced by the findings of Kinder and Kiewert (1981) and subsequent researchers that policy 
opinions are more closely aligned with answers to questions that pose sociotropic concerns than those that 
pose narrow self-interest concerns.  Whether this is because people care more about society-wide policy 
impacts than personal impacts is widely debated.  Our view is that answers to sociotropic questions identify 
the strength of personal concern about an issue, and reflect a combination of perceived personal and social 
impacts.  A similar view is expressed in Bobo and Kluegel (1993).     6 
 
We assume that concerns about compositional amenities are reflected in answers to five 
other questions:   
vi.   Do you agree or disagree that it is better for a country if everyone shares the same 
       customs and traditions? 
vii. Do you agree or disagree that it is better for a country if there is a variety of different 
       religions? 
viii. Do you agree or disagree that it is better for a country if everyone can speak one 
       common language? 
ix.   Would you say that a country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by the 
       presence of immigrants? 
x.    Do you agree or disagree that a country should stop immigration if it wants to 
       reduce social tensions? 
 
Formally, we assume that the responses to these 10 questions, denoted as (z1i, z2i,…,z10i), 
are related to the underlying factors f1i and f2i and to observed characteristics of the 
respondent by a set of linear equations:
6 
(3a) zji  =  Mj f1i +   cj Xi  +  νji     ,  j=1,2,…5. 
(3b) zji  =  Mj f2i +   cj Xi  +  νji     ,  j=6,7,…10. 
Thus, responses to the first 5 questions are treated as noisy indicators of f1i, while 
responses to the second group of questions are treated as noisy indicators of f2i.  
  To complete the model, we assume that the latent factors are related to the 
observed respondent characteristics and a pair of idiosyncratic errors: 
(4a) f1i  =  b1 Xi  +  ω1i        
(4b) f2i  =  b2 Xi  +  ω2i   . 
Combing the preceding equations yields a set of reduced forms for the responses (yi, zji):  
(5a)   yi   =  Γ0 Xi  +   ε0i 
Γ0  =  λ1b1 + λ2b2 + α  ;       ε0i  =   λ1 ω1i  +   λ2 ω2i  +   µi   , 
(5b)     zji  =  Γj Xi   +  εji 
                                                 
6 Different questions in the ESS used different response scales.  As explained below, we assign cardinal 
values to the ordered responses then linearly transform the responses to lie between 0 and 1.    7 
 
  Γj  =   Mj b1 + cj   ;     εji   =   Mj ω1i  +  νji ,      j=1,2,…5  , 
  Γj   =  Mj b2 + cj   ;        εji   =  Mj ω2i  +  νji,      j=6,7,…10 . 
These equations form a linear system with cross-equation and covariance restrictions. 
  Our goal is to identify the relative importance of the factors f1i and f2i in shaping 
preferences over immigration policy.  We proceed by making a series of assumptions on 
the covariances between the error components in the structural equations (2), (3) and (4) 
that allow us to identify λ1, λ2, and the Mj’s from the variance-covariance matrix of the 
reduced-form residuals ε0i and εji  (j=1…10). The remaining parameters – in particular the 
coefficients α, b1, and b2 that determine the projection of y on the X’s – are then 
identified from the Γj’s (i.e., the reduced-form regression coefficients).
7   
Our key assumptions on the error components (µi, νji, ω1i, ω2i) are: 
(6a) Var[ω1i | Xi]  =  1,  Var[ω2i | Xi]  =  1,   Cov[ω1i , ω2i  | Xi]  =  σ12 . 
(6b)   Var[νji | Xi] = φj ,  Cov[νji , νki | Xi] =  0  ( j ≠ k )  , 
 Cov[νji, ω1i | Xi]  = Cov[νji, ω2i | Xi]  =  0 .  
(6c) Var[µi | Xi] = σµ,   Cov[µi ,ω1i | Xi]  =  Cov[µi ,ω2i | Xi]  = Cov[µi , νji | Xi]  =  0 . 
The assumptions in (6a) are normalizations: we scale the model by assuming that the 
variances of the unobserved determinants f1i and f2i are both equal to 1, and we allow an 
arbitrary correlation σ12 between them.  The assumptions in (6b) are restrictive: here we 
are assuming that the correlation between the structural errors for any two indicators 
arises solely through their joint dependence on the latent factors f1i and f2i.  Substituting 
these assumptions into (5a) and (5b) we have  
(7a) Var[εji | Xi]  =  Mj²  +  φj  ,  
                                                 
7 In practice we follow this “two step” procedure, first estimating a model for the variance-covariance 
matrix of the reduced form residuals of the z’s and y, then estimating α, b1, and b2 from the Γj’s.  In 
principal we could also use a 1-step method.    8 
 
(7b) Cov[εji, εki | Xi]  = Mj Mk       if j≠k and they are from the same group of indicators 
(7c)   Cov[εji, εki | Xi]  = Mj Mk σ12       if j≠k and they are from different groups. 
Equations (7a)-(7c) restrict the 10×10 covariance matrix of the reduced form errors for 
the observed indicators to be a function of only 21 parameters: the 10 Mj’s, the 10 φj’s, 
and σ12. 
  The assumptions in equation (6c) are also restrictive: here we are assuming that 
the structural error in the primary response equation, µi, is uncorrelated with the 
unobserved determinants of the latent factors, and with structural errors in the equations 
for the indicators zji.  Provided the two latent factors f1i and f2i are the only channels that 
mediate concerns over immigration, these restrictions are plausible, since in that case µi is 
effectively an approximation error. As discussed below we evaluate this assumption by 
fitting a more general model that allows for a third independent factor representing 
altruistic concerns over people in other countries.  
Assumptions in (6c) impose a simple structure on the covariances between the 
reduced form error in y and the reduced form errors for the zj’s: 
(8a) Cov[ε0i, εji | Xi]  =   (λ1 + λ2 σ12 )Mj   ,          j ≤ 5 
(8b) Cov[ε0i, εji | Xi]  =   (λ2 + λ1 σ12 )Mj   ,          j ≥ 6  . 
(8c) Var[ε0i | Xi]  =   λ1
2  +  λ2
2  +  2λ1λ2σ12   +    σµ. 
Given σ12 and the Mj’s, λ1, λ2 and σµ are identified from these residual covariances.
8 In 
Appendix A, we explain the details of our estimation procedures, and how we calculate 
the standard errors. 
 
                                                 
8 As explained below, we actually fit the system with multiple “y” variables, allowing separate values of λ1 
and λ2 (and a separate value for the variance σµ) for each y-variable.    9 
 
b. Decomposition of Differences Between Groups 
  Although the relative size of λ1 and λ2 identifies the relative importance of 
economic concerns and compositional concerns in explaining differences in attitudes 
within groups, a decomposition of differences in attitudes between groups requires 
estimates of the parameters (α, b1, b2).  Equation (5a) specifies that the reduced-form 
coefficients relating y to X can be decomposed as: 
  Γ0  =  λ1b1 + λ2b2 + α  . 
The total effect of X on y arises through three channels: economic concerns (λ1b1); 
amenity concerns (λ2b2); and any direct effect of the X’s on attitudes (α).  To sort out the 
relative importance of these channels we need estimates of α, b1, and b2. 
  Even knowing (Mj , σ12, λ1, λ2, v)  it is not possible to separately identify (α, b1, b2) 
without further assumptions.  Indeed, equations (5a) and (5b) imply that the 11 reduced-
form coefficient vectors (Γ0, Γ1,…Γ10) depend on 13 structural coefficient vectors (α, b1, 
b2, c1,… c10).  Obviously we need to impose some restrictions on the c’s in order to 
identify (α, b1, b2) from the estimated Γk’s.   We consider three cases.  As a baseline we 
assume that cj=0 for j=1,2…10.   Under this assumption, the X’s exert no independent 
effect on the indicator questions.  A weaker assumption is that cj=c for j=1,2…10  (i.e., 
that the X’s have a parallel effect on all the Z’s, holding constant f1i and f2i).  A third, 
even weaker assumption is that the X’s have the same effects on the indicators for each of 
the underlying factors, i.e., that 
 c 1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = c5 = c
E      and    c6 = c7 = c8 = c9 = c10 = c
A .    10 
 
Each of these assumptions is sufficient to allow us to identify the key coefficients (α, b1, 
b2).   As we discuss in more detail below, our main decomposition results are quite 
similar regardless of the restrictions we impose on the c’s to achieve identification.  
 
c. Extensions 
  The model represented by equations (2), (3) and (4) can be extended in a number 
of directions.  One possibility is that attitudes toward immigration depend on more than 
the two factors included in our basic model.  As a check we add a third “altruism factor” 
reflecting concerns about the welfare of potential immigrants, and use a set of additional 
questions in the ESS as indicators of this factor.  In principal other factors could also be 
added, although identification depends on the availability of suitable indicator questions. 
  A second extension is to relax (or modify) the assumed relationship between the 
observed indicator questions and the underlying factors.  We report on two examples in 
Section V, below.  In one variant we add a 6
th potential indicator of concern over 
compositional amenities – a question on the potential relationship between immigration 
and crime (“Are crime problems made better or worse by people coming to stay here?”).  
In another variant we drop one of the indicators of economic concern (“Do you agree or 
disagree that immigrants help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers?”) that 
has a relatively weak relation with the other four questions.   
 
III. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
a. The 2002 ESS Survey    11 
 
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an annual cross-country survey covering 21 
European countries, with 1,500-3,000 respondents per country.
9  In collaboration with the 
ESS survey design team we developed a special immigration module for the 2002 survey.  
The aim of the module was to gather respondents’ opinions about immigration policy, 
and their views on how immigration affects conditions in their country, in order to better 
understand the channels that mediate pro- or anti-immigrant sentiment.  We developed a 
series of questions that attempt to distinguish between the perceived impacts of 
immigration on economic conditions (wages, taxes, unemployment) and social 
homogeneity and cohesion that we use as indicators of economic and compositional 
amenity concerns.    
Some basic descriptive statistics for the 2002 ESS survey are presented in 
Appendix Table 1, which shows sample sizes and demographic characteristics of 
respondents in each country.  The pooled sample for all 21 countries contains about 
36,000 observations and is just over 50% female, has an average age of 47, is made up of 
about 90% natives and 10% immigrants, and includes about 3% minority group members 
(most of whom are immigrants).  As would be expected, the shares of immigrants (and 
ethnic minorities) vary substantially across countries, with relatively low immigrant 
shares in Finland, Italy, Hungary, and Poland and relatively high fractions in Luxemburg 
and Switzerland.  On average about one-half of respondents are employed and one-fifth 
are retired: these fractions also vary somewhat by country.  Forty percent of respondents 
have only primary schooling while 18% have some tertiary education.  The share of low-
                                                 
9 Israel also participated in the 2002 ESS, but is excluded from our analysis.  Detailed information on the 
2002 ESS design and implementation is available at 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/index.jsp?year=2003&country=&module=documentation .    12 
 
education respondents is relatively high in Portugal, Hungary, Spain, Greece, Italy and 




b. Respondent Attitudes to Immigration 
This subsection describes the questions in the ESS that we use to measure pro- 
and anti-immigrant sentiment.  A preliminary issue that arises in any cross-country 
survey is how to define “immigrants”.  Although in Britain and the U.S. an “immigrant” 
is usually interpreted as someone born abroad, in countries with citizenship based on 
blood ancestry (jus sanguinis) “immigrants” may include people born in the country who 
are not citizens.  To eliminate ambiguity the questions in the ESS module refer to “people 
who come to live in a country” (rather than immigrants or migrants) and solicit opinions 
about whether more or less people should be allowed to “come to live here.”   For 
readability, however, we use the term “immigrants” throughout this paper. 
A related issue is how to measure respondents’ views about restricting the number 
of immigrants from different source countries.  The ESS module uses a 4-way 
classification:  richer European countries; poorer European countries; richer non-
European countries; and poorer non-European countries.  It also asks separate questions 
about admitting people of the same or different ethnicity than the majority population, 
yielding a total of 6 questions on the tightening or loosening of immigration policies for 
specific immigrant groups.  We consider responses to each of these questions as well as    13 
 
the “average response” to the four country-group-specific responses (i.e., an unweighted 
average of the four ordinal responses). 
  We also examine responses to two summary assessment questions about the effect 
of immigration:  (1) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [this country’s] 
economy that people come to live here from other countries?”;  (2)  Is [this country] 
made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?  These two, plus the seven questions on immigration policy for specific 
groups, form the dependent variables in our statistical analysis (i.e., the “y” variables in 
our model).  
The ESS questionnaire elicited views about allowing more or less people to come 
from different source countries using a 4 point scale (“allow many to come here”, “allow 
some”, “allow a few”, “allow none”).  Opinions on the two summary assessment 
questions were elicited using an 11 point scale (scored 0 to 10).
10  Table 1 shows the 
distributions of the responses to these questions across all respondents in our 21-country 
sample.
11  For the 4-point questions (Panel A) we show the complete distribution, 
whereas for the 11-point questions (Panel B) we classify the responses into 5 intervals: 0-
1 (relatively strong negative opinion); 2-4 (somewhat negative); 5 (the midpoint 
response); 6-8 (somewhat positive) and 9-10 (relatively strong positive). 
The responses in Panel A suggest a diversity of opinion on the issue of 
immigration, with 40-45% of ESS respondents preferring to admit none, or only a few 
immigrants from a particular source group, and 55-60% preferring to admit some or 
many.  Respondents are slightly more supportive of immigration from rich European 
                                                 
10 I.e., respondents were asked to fill in a number between 1 and 10 with 1 representing “bad for the 
economy” (or “worse place to live”) and 10 representing “good for the economy” (or “better place to live”).   
11 In Table 1 and elsewhere in the paper we drop all missing or “don’t know” responses.    14 
 
countries than from poor non-European countries, although the differential is modest.  
They are also more favourably disposed toward people of the same ethnicity than those of 
a different ethnic background, but again the differential is small. 
The responses to the overall assessment questions, in Panel B, reveal a similar 
diversity of opinion.  Interestingly, people have more positive views about the economic 
effects of immigration than on the question of whether immigrants make the country a 
better place to live.  For example, 38% rate the economic effect of immigration with a 
score of 6 or higher (on a 0-10 point scale), whereas only 28% rate the effect on the 
quality of life in the same positive range.  In the context of our model this contrast 
suggests that many respondents associate immigration with negative compositional 
amenities that offset the economic benefits of population inflows. 
For ease of interpretation we linearly re-scaled the ordinal responses to these 
questions so that the most positive (pro-immigrant) response is 1 and the most negative 
(anti-immigrant) response is 0.  Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the re-scaled 
responses to the 8 questions across the overall ESS sample.  The main entries in the table 
are simple correlations, while the entries in italics are adjusted correlations, based on 
residuals from regressions on country dummies and a set of observed covariates (gender, 
age, ethnicity, employment status, and city residence).   Responses to the first six 
immigration policy questions are highly inter-correlated, but the correlations between 
these questions and the overall assessment questions are weaker.  The adjusted 
correlations are only slightly smaller in magnitude than the raw correlations, reflecting 
the fact that the R-squared coefficients from the first-step regressions are modest (<0.15).    15 
 
Although our focus in this paper is on understanding the channels that mediate 
pro- and anti-immigrant sentiment within a given country, much existing research has 
addressed cross-country differences in attitudes toward immigration.
12  Appendix Table 2 
presents the means of the standardized responses to the questions described in Tables 1 
and 2 for each of the 21 countries in our sample.  The range of national opinions is 
relatively wide:  in the two countries with the most negative views about immigration 
(Greece and Hungary) the mean standardized response to the question on allowing more 
immigrants of a different ethnicity is 0.31
13, whereas in Sweden – the country with the 
most positive view – the mean standardized response is 0.69.  Using the same metric, 
opinions are also relatively negative in Portugal (0.41) and Austria (0.44), and relatively 
positive in Switzerland (0.59) and Italy (0.57). 
Figure 1 illustrates the cross-country variation in average responses to the two 
“overall assessment” questions.  Each point in the figure represents a country: the x-axis 
shows the mean response to the question “Is immigration good or bad for the economy?” 
while the y-axis shows the mean response to the question “Do immigrants make the 
country a better or worse place to live?”  Across countries the answers are highly 
correlated (ρ=0.7), though there are some notable departures from the 45 degree line.  
Sweden (SE) and Austria (AT) make an interesting comparison: residents of the two 
countries have similar (and relatively positive) opinions about the economic effect of 
immigrants, but much different views about their effect on quality of life.  Interestingly, 
their responses on the immigration policy questions are more closely aligned with the 
                                                 
12 Recent contributions include Gang et al. (2002); Mayda, 2006; and Davidov et al. (2009). 
13 Note that the standardized response for this question assigns a value of 1 for “allow many”, 0.66 for 
“allow some”, 0.33 for “allow few” and 0 for “allow none.  A mean value of 0.31 implies that the average 
response is somewhat less favorable than the second lowest category.    16 
 
latter: Swedes have the most positive opinion on allowing more immigrants whereas 
Austrians are among the most negative.  
c. Indicators of Concerns about the Effects of Immigration 
An innovative feature of the ESS immigration module, and the key to our 
identification strategy, is the series of “indicator” questions described in Section II that 
ask respondents about the effects of immigration on wages, job opportunities, and taxes, 
on one hand, and social, cultural, and linguistic cohesion on the other.  Table 3 shows the 
mean values of the standardized responses to these indicator questions, along with the 
correlations of the response with three summary measures of pro- or anti-immigrant 
sentiment: the average response to the questions about allowing many/some/few/none 
people from each of the four groups of sending countries; the response to whether 
immigration is good or bad for the economy; and the response to whether immigrants 
make the country a better or worse place to live.
14 
  The responses to the indicator questions for economic concerns suggest a mildly 
negative opinion about the effects of immigration. For example, the mean responses to 
the questions “Do you agree or disagree that wages are brought down by immigration?” 
and “Do you agree or disagree that immigrants harm the economic prospects of the 
poor?” are 0.49 and 0.43, respectively.  Since a “neither agree nor disagree” response is 
scaled as 0.5 (whereas strongly agree=0 and strongly disagree=1), the average respondent 
is somewhat more inclined to agree.  Among the indicators of concern over 
compositional amenities, the average responses are more variable.  Respondents strongly 
agree with the question “Do you agree or disagree that it is better for a country if 
                                                 
14 As with the questions on immigration policy and the overall effect of immigration, we standardize the 
responses to the indicator questions using a linear transformation of the original ordinal scale that sets the 
most negative (anti-immigrant) response to 0 and the most positive (pro-immigrant) response to 1.     17 
 
everyone can speak a common language?”, but are evenly split on the question “Do you 
agree or disagree that it is better for a country if there is a variety of different 
religions?”, and are mildly supportive of the view that immigration enriches cultural life 
(mean response = 0.58). 
  In one of our robustness checks (see section Va) we consider adding a sixth 
indicator of concern over compositional amenities, based on responses to the question 
“Are crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here?”.  As shown 
in Table 3, responses to this question suggest many people believe immigrants cause 
additional crime: the standardized response is 0.31 (with 0=worse and 1=better), and 40% 
respond in the lowest 3 categories (0-3 on a 0-10 scale)
 15  Responses to this question are 
reasonably highly correlated with responses to the other 5 indicators of compositional 
concerns (with correlations between 0.16 and 0.35). 
  We also extend our two-factor model to three factors by defining a third channel 
of concern reflecting international responsibility and altruism. We use three questions as 
indicators for this factor:    
i.   Do you think that when people leave their country to come here it has a good or bad 
      effect on their country in the long run? 
ii. Do you agree or disagree that richer countries have a responsibility to accept people 
      from poorer countries? 
iii. Do you agree or disagree that all countries benefit if people can move to countries 
      where their skills are most needed? 
 
Responses to these three questions are summarized in the bottom rows of Table 3.  ESS 
respondents appear to believe that emigration harms the sending country (mean response 
= 0.44), but also agree that richer countries have a responsibility to accept immigrants, 
                                                 
15 Unlike the case in the U.S. (see e.g., Butcher and Piehl, 2007) immigrants appear to be over-represented 
in the prison populations in many European countries – see Wasquant, 1999.    18 
 
(mean response = 0.60), and that free mobility benefits all countries (mean response = 
0.68). 
As shown in columns (2)-(4) of Table 3, responses to most of the indicator 
questions are reasonably highly correlated with views on immigration policy (column 2), 
and with overall assessments of the effects of immigration (columns 3 and 4).  Focusing 
on the indicators for our two main channels, the weakest correlations are for the question 
of whether immigrants tend to fill shortages, and on the value of a common language.  
The “fill vacancies” question is also weakly correlated with the other indicators of 
economic concerns, and in one of our robustness checks we consider taking it out of the 
model.  The low correlation between the “common language” question and the y-
variables reflects the strong consensus among respondents on the value of a common 
language (which we interpret as an anti-immigrant sentiment).
16  The indicator with the 
highest correlation with the overall assessment questions is the one asking whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life.  This has a 0.56 correlation with the “good 
or bad for the economy” question, and an even stronger 0.61 correlation with the “make 
the country a better or worse place” question.  Responses to whether a country should 
“stop immigration to reduce social tensions” are also highly correlated with the overall 
assessment questions, and with views on immigration policy.  In contrast, the indicators 
for altruistic concerns are relatively weakly correlated with the outcome variables. 
 
IV. Estimation Results 
a. Preliminaries 
                                                 
16 Over 90 percent of respondents either strongly agree (42%) or agree (51%) with the view that a common 
language is better.    19 
 
Our estimation procedure has three steps. First, we estimate unrestricted OLS 
regressions of the outcome variable (y) and the indicators (the z’s) on the observed 
covariates X.  Then we take the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals and 
apply a minimum-distance technique to estimate the structural parameters (M1,…M10, 
φ1,…φ10, σ12, λ1, λ2, v).
17  Finally, we use these parameters and the estimated reduced-
form coefficients Γj (j=0,1,…10) to estimate the coefficient vectors b1, b2, and c1,… c10.  
As explained in Appendix A, the third step is accomplished by a simple least squares 
algorithm. 
We include in the vector X a constant, country dummies, and a set of 13 personal 
characteristics (all dummy variables): indicators for age (3 dummies), gender, education 
(2 dummies), labor force status (3 dummies), immigrant status, minority status, and city 
size (2 dummies).  Thus, the Γj’s and the vectors (α, b1, b2, cj) all have dimension 34.  As 
noted earlier, we use 9 different y-variables (the 8 variables listed in Table 1 plus an 
average of the responses to the 4 questions on allowing different groups to immigrate).  
Estimates of the Γj’s for these 9 y-variables are reported in Appendix Tables A3a-A3c. 
Estimates for the 13 potential indicator variables, as well as the variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimated reduced form residuals, are available from the authors on request.  
 
b. Results for Baseline Model 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results from our baseline specification.  A 
more complete set of parameter estimates is presented in Appendix Tables 3.  The 
columns of Table 4 shows the results for 3 choices of y: the average of the responses to 
                                                 
17 We use unweighted minimum distance.  Our methodology is summarized in Appendix A.  We actually 
fit the model to the indicators and the full set of 9 y’s jointly.  Thus we estimate (M1,…M10),  (φ1,…φ10),  
σ12, and 9 triples of coefficients (λ1, λ2,v) – one triple for each y.  .    20 
 
the 4 questions on allowing people to immigrate (column 1); the response to whether 
immigration is good or bad for the economy (column 2); and the response to whether 
immigrants make the country better or worse (column 3).   For each choice of y we show 
the estimated values of the “loading factors” (λ1, λ2), the estimate of the correlation σ12 
between the two latent factors (which is estimated once for all the different y’s), and the 
implied decompositions of the estimated differentials in the outcome between young 
(under 30) and old (over 60) respondents (rows 3a-3c), high and low educated 
respondents (rows 4a-4c), unemployed versus employed respondents (rows 5a-5c), and 
big city residents versus residents of rural areas (rows 6a-6c).
18 
Looking first at our main outcome measure – the averaged “immigration policy” 
variable in column 1 – the estimates of λ1 and λ2 are 0.025 and 0.102, respectively.
19  
Since the latent factors are scaled to have unit variance, these estimates imply that 
concerns over compositional amenities are roughly 4 times more important in explaining 
the variation in opinions on immigration policy within demographic subgroups than 
concerns over economic issues.   
The estimate of the correlation of the latent factors is relatively high (close to 0.8) 
so on average, people who express stronger concerns about one factor tend to express 
stronger concerns about the other.  In the context of the model represented by equations 
(1) and (2) the scale of this correlation depends on the correlation of the presumed 
impacts of immigration on respondents’ incomes and local amenities, and on how these 
                                                 
18 As shown in equation (5a), the reduced form regression coefficients Γ0  (from the regression of y on X) 
can be decomposed as: Γ0 = λ1b1 + λ2b2 + α .  Since all the elements of X are dummies representing 
different categories of people, the estimated coefficients in Γ0 represent differentials in mean responses 
across groups.  
19 This average is perhaps most similar to the question typically analyzed in the literature (e.g. Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001; Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003), which asks whether immigration should be 
reduced or increased, with no reference to source country.    21 
 
impacts are correlated with the “loudness” that people report their concerns on a survey 
like the ESS.  If people who tend to respond to questionnaires by selecting extreme 
responses anticipate larger impacts of immigration on their wages and local amenities the 
two latent concerns will be more highly correlated than if those who tend to select 
responses closer to the middle anticipate larger impacts.
20  In any case, the high 
correlation of the latent factors suggests that one could elicit a relatively accurate overall 
opinion about immigration policy by only focusing on one channel or the other. 
The decomposition results in rows 3-6 suggest that a relatively high fraction of 
the differences in opinions about immigration policy by age, education, labor force status, 
and city size is explained by differences in concerns over compositional amenities, 
whereas the contribution of economic concerns is smaller.  Specifically, about 70% of the 
gaps between older and younger respondents, and between low-educated and high-
educated respondents, are attributed to compositional concerns.  The share of the gap 
between employed and unemployed is smaller (50%) whereas the share of the gap 
between large city and rural residents is a little larger (77%).   
The results in column 2 for the question of whether immigration is good or bad 
for the economy provide an interesting contrast to those in column 1.  Here, the loading 
factors are 0.120 and 0.038, respectively, suggesting that the latent component of 
variance we are identifying as “standard economic concerns” (over wages, taxes and 
benefits) has over a 4 times larger effect on the overall assessment about economic 
effects of immigration than the latent component we are identifying as “compositional 
                                                 
20 Suppose that respondent i believes that an increase in immigration will lead to a change ∆wi in her wage, 
and a change ∆ai in the composition of her neighborhood.  Suppose that people have similar indirect utility 
functions u(w+b−t, a), but vary in their response functions gi.  Respondent i’s concern about the wage 
effect of immigration is gi′·∂u/∂w ∆wi while her concern about the amenity effect is gi′·∂u/∂a ∆ai.  The 
correlation of the reported concerns depends on how gi is correlated with ∆wi, and ∆ai.     22 
 
amenity concerns.”  At first glance the fact that compositional concerns play any role in 
the response on the “good or bad for the economy” question may be interpreted as a 
problem for our identification assumptions.  Our interpretation, however, is that 
respondents, like many economists, view cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity as 
potential problems for the economy.  Lazear (1999) for example, has argued that a 
common culture and language enhance trade and specialization. Likewise a large 
literature in development economics concludes that ethnic diversity harms political 
stability and growth (see e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrera, 2003).  
Consistent with the much higher value for λ1 than λ2, a relatively large share of 
the between-group differences in answers to the “good or bad for the economy” question 
is explained by differential economic concerns.  For example, about 70% of the 0.12 gap 
between high- and low education respondents is attributable to economic concerns.  
Economic concerns more than fully explain the gaps between young and old respondents, 
and between the employed and unemployed. 
Column 3 shows the results for a second overall assessment question – do 
immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live?  For this question λ1=0.047 
and λ2=0.100, implying that compositional concerns are about twice as important as 
economic concerns.  There is some tendency for the model to “over-explain” differentials 
in answers to this question by age and education.  Indeed, differences in compositional 
concerns are large enough to fully explain the age and education gaps. Differences in 
economic concerns contribute a little more explanatory power. 
Although the average response to questions about admitting more or less 
immigrants is a useful summary measure of policy views, it is also interesting to compare    23 
 
the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in explaining opinions 
about specific immigrant groups.  Table 5 shows the results for the average measure (top 
row of the table) and for each of the four country groups, as well as for questions about 
admission of people of the same or different ethnicity.  The estimate of λ1 – which 
reflects the relative intensity of economic concerns – is a little bigger for questions about 
European versus non-European immigrants, and for people of the same ethnicity than for 
those of different ethnicity.  One explanation for this pattern is that respondents perceive 
Europeans and immigrants of the same ethnicity as potential substitutes for their labor 
services, whereas non-Europeans and those of a different ethnicity as viewed as potential 
complements.   The estimates of λ2 – which reflect the relative intensity of compositional 
concerns – follow a very different pattern, being lower for people from rich countries 
(and for those of the same ethnicity), and higher for people from poor countries (and for 
those of a different ethnicity). 
  As shown in columns 3-8 of Table 3, differences in the intensity of economic 
concerns explain a relatively modest share (10-20%) of the age and education gaps in 
average opinions about admission of different groups.  Differences in the intensity of 
concern over compositional effects play a larger role, explaining 50% of the differential 
between high- and low educated respondents in views about admitting people from rich 
European countries but 90% or more of the gap in views about admitting people from 
poorer countries or those of a different ethnicity.   
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V.  Robustness Checks and Extensions 
a. Varying the Indicator Questions 
  The identification of our structural model is predicated on the a priori link 
between the latent factors and the indicator questions.  We have estimated a number of 
alternative specifications in which we add or subtract questions from the set that are 
associated with each factor.  In this section we briefly summarize two examples. First, we 
consider adding a sixth question on immigration and crime to the set of indicators of 
concern over compositional amenities.  Crime is a “hot button” issue that is often raised 
by critics of immigration, and as we noted in the discussion of Table 3, responses on the 
question of whether immigration makes crime better or worse are fairly high correlated 
with our the indicators of compositional concern. Second, we consider removing the 
question on whether immigrants fill job vacancies from the set of indicators of economic 
concerns.  Responses to this question are more favorable (i.e., pro-immigrant) than 
responses to the other economic indicators and are also noticeably less related to opinions 
on immigration policy (see Table 3).  
  Table 6a summarizes the estimation results for the specification that adds the 
question on crime as a sixth indicator of compositional concerns.  This addition leads to a 
larger estimate of λ2 and a smaller estimate of λ1 for all three outcome variables in the 
table.  For the immigration policy question (column 1) and the quality of life measure 
(column 3) compositional concerns are now about 9-10 times more important than 
economic concerns in explaining within-group variation in attitudes.  For the “good or 
bad for the economy” question (column 2) the relative size of f λ2 is also increased 
relative to the baseline specification, though the change is small.  When concerns over    25 
 
crime are included as an indicator of compositional concerns, this factor also explains a 
somewhat larger share of the variation in average responses by age, education, 
employment status, or city size. 
  Table 6b summarizes the results when we remove the “weakest” indicator of 
economic concerns, which asks to what extent immigrants fill job vacancies.  This 
change leads to estimates that are very close to our baseline model, although for all three 
outcomes the relative importance of economic concerns falls slightly.  Similar findings 
emerge when we evaluate the effect of removing other indicator questions.  In each case 
we obtain estimates that are relatively close to those from our baseline model, with 
similar magnitudes for the key factor loading parameters λ1 and λ2.    
  We have also estimated variants of the model in which one (or more) of the 
indicator questions is allowed to reflect both economic and compositional concerns.
21  In 
one case, for example, we allowed the question on whether “immigrants take out more 
than they put in” to depend on both economic and compositional concerns.  This 
specification led to estimates of λ1 and λ2 that are not too different from those in our 
baseline model, though again the relative importance of compositional concerns was 
slightly higher.  All in all we believe the estimates reported for our baseline model are 
broadly representative of the range of results from alternative specifications of the 
indicator variables. 
 
b. Alternative Assumptions on the c-vector 
                                                 
21 Formally, this change replaces equations (3a) and (3b) with a more general specification:  zji = M1j f1i + 
M2j f2i + cj Xi + νji .  Provided that there are enough indicators that only depend on f1i, and that only depend 
on f2i, the model remains identified.    26 
 
  The interpretation of the way economic and compositional concerns affect attitude 
to immigration policy, and how immigrants affect the economy and the wider society has 
been conditional on observed characteristics, or within demographic groups. As discussed 
in Section II, we have to restrict the way that the X’s affect the indicator questions (i.e., 
the c vectors in equations 3a and 3b) in order to separately identify the contributions of 
economic and compositional concerns in explaining differences in average opinions 
across demographic groups.   Our baseline model imposes the rather strict assumption 
that cj = 0 for all j.  Table 7 compares the implications of this choice to two alternatives: 
cj = c for all j (i.e., a single c vector) and cj = c
E  for all 5 indicators of economic concern, 
cj = c
A for all 5 indicators of compositional concerns (i.e., factor-specific c-vectors).
22  
Comparisons across the columns of Table 7 suggest that the alternative choices lead to 
similar qualitative conclusions about the relative importance of economic and 
compositional concerns in explaining views about admitting more or less immigrants.  
Irrespective of the assumptions on the c-vectors, our model implies that most of the 
differences in average opinions by age, education, employment status, and city size are 
driven by differences in compositional concerns.    We have also compared the 
decompositions of mean responses for the country-group specific questions and for the 
two summary questions, and found that the qualitative conclusions are invariant to the 
specification of the c-vector.  Mean differences across groups in response to the “better or 
worse for the economy” question are largely attributable to differences in economic 
concerns, while differences in response to the question “do immigrants make this a better 
or worse place to live” are mainly attributed to differences in compositional concerns. 
                                                 
22 Note that alternative assumptions on cj have no effect on the estimates of λ1, λ2, or σ12:  in all three cases 
these are the same as in Table 4.    27 
 
 
c. Three Factor Model 
  Our baseline model assumes that respondents answer questions about immigration 
policy from a purely self-interested perspective, giving no weight to the welfare of 
potential immigrants.  To evaluate the potential limitations of this view we developed an 
extended 3-factor model that includes a third “altruistic” channel.  We use the three 
questions described at the bottom of Table 3 as indicators of respondents’ altruistic 
concerns.  These questions ask whether respondents think immigration is good or bad for 
the sending country; whether rich countries have a responsibility to accept migrants; and 
whether they agree or disagree that free mobility benefits all countries (i.e., both sending 
and receiving nations). 
  Estimation results for this model are summarized in Table 8.  The estimates of the 
loading factors λ1 and λ2 are not too different from our baseline model, although in the 
case of the immigration policy question (column 1) the altruism factor appears to pick up 
some of the variation that was attributed to compositional concerns in our 2-factor model.  
For the overall assessment questions (columns 2 and 3) the estimates of λ3 are statistically 
different than 0 but of a relatively small magnitude.  The estimated correlations of the 
three latent factors are all relatively large and positive. 
  Interestingly, the addition of altruistic concerns does not change our conclusion 
about the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in explaining 
differences in views across groups. The decompositions in Table 8 suggest that 
compositional concerns account for 60% or more of the gaps across age and education 
groups, whereas economic concerns account for no more than 13%.     28 
 
 
d. Fitting the Model by Country 
  Up to this point we have pooled responses to the ESS survey from each of the 21 
countries, adding a set of country dummy variables to the vector X to adjust for 
differences across countries.  Arguably, however, there are such wide differences across 
European countries in the historical context of immigration, and in the salience of 
economic and compositional concerns, that the full set of parameters in our model may 
vary across countries.  As a final robustness check we therefore estimated our baseline 
model separately for each country.  The results are summarized in Table 9, where we 
show the estimates of the key parameters λ1 and λ2 for each country, along with the 
shares of the age and education gaps in average opinions about whether more or less 
immigrants should be admitted that are attributable to economic and compositional 
concerns.   
  The estimates of λ1 and λ2 for the individual countries suggest that in nearly all 
European countries, compositional concerns outweigh economic concerns in mediating 
opinions about immigration policy.  In three countries – Austria, Spain, and France – the 
estimate of λ1 is actually slightly negative while in 8 others the estimate is positive but 
relatively small and insignificantly different from 0.  In contrast the estimates of λ2 are all 
positive and significant, with a range of point estimates from 0.053 to 0.156.
23   The sole 
exception to the tendency for the estimate of λ2 to exceed the estimate of λ1 is Poland.
24   
  Reflecting the relative magnitudes of the estimates of λ1 and λ2, the 
                                                 
23 Although not reported in the table, the estimates of the correlation between the latent factors are all in the 
range of 0.70 to 0.90.  
24 The parameter estimates for Luxembourg are not reported in Table 9.  The estimates for λ1 and λ2 for 
Luxembourg are -0.74 (standard error = 1.54) and 0.87 (1.54) respectively.  The sample of respondents 
with useable data from Luxembourg is very small (n=553).    29 
 
decompositions of the age and education gaps in opinions about immigration policy in 
columns 3-8 of Table 9 suggest that compositional concerns are typically more important 
than economic concerns in explaining the more negative opinions of older (over age 60) 
versus younger (under age 30) respondents, and likewise in explaining the more positive 
opinions of highly educated (at least some tertiary education) versus poorly educated 
(only primary schooling) respondents.  The relative importance of compositional 
concerns in explaining the education gaps in different countries is illustrated in Figure 2, 
which plots the education gap in compositional concerns in each country against the raw 
education gap for that country.  The scatter of points suggests that a very strong 
relationship between the total gap and the share attributable to compositional concerns. 
  We also examined the relative importance of economic and compositional 
concerns in explaining responses to the two overall assessment questions.  Consistent 
with our findings for the pooled sample, in nearly all countries economic concerns are the 
dominant channel influencing views about whether immigrants are “good or bad for the 
economy”  whereas compositional concerns are the dominant channel influencing views 
about whether immigrants make the country “ a better or worse place to live”.
25  As in 
Table 9, the estimates of λ1 and λ2 for the two overall assessment questions are relatively 
tightly distributed around the corresponding point estimates from the pooled model, 
suggesting that the pooled estimates are a good summary of the “average” importance of 
the channels in different countries. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
                                                 
25 Luxembourg generates poorly identified (and rather large) estimates for λ1 and λ2 for these outcomes too.    30 
 
Why is the general public more favorably inclined to free trade than the 
liberalization of immigration policy?   In standard trade models, the two policies are 
effectively substitutes.  But these models fail to take into account the value that people 
place on compositional amenities.  Immigration, unlike trade, changes the composition of 
the receiving country’s population:   its habits, culture, and religion.  A large body of 
economic research has shown that concerns over the characteristics of neighbors, 
schoolmates, and co-workers play a role in decision-making over what neighborhood to 
live in; what schools to attend; which city to live in; and which employees to hire.  In this 
paper we argue that similar concerns play an important part in mediating views about 
immigration policy. 
  Using a set of questions explicitly designed for the 2002 European Social Survey 
we estimate a simple structural model that assumes that people care about both the 
“conventional” economic effects of immigration (on their wages, taxes, and benefits) and 
the compositional effects on their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces.  Our 
empirical results confirm that both concerns are important, though compositional 
concerns are significantly more important in understanding the variation in attitudes 
toward immigration policy.  For example, 70% of the gap between the most- and least-
educated respondents in the ESS on the issue of whether immigration should be increased 
or reduced is attributable to differences in the intensity of concern over compositional 
amenities, while differences in economic concerns account for 10-15%.  Differences in 
compositional concerns also explain most of the differences in attitudes between older 
and younger respondents.  The age gap is a particular puzzle for models of immigration    31 
 
preferences that ignore compositional amenities, because many older people are retired, 
and face a much lower threat of labor market competition than young people. 
  While our inferences are based on purely observational data, and rely on a 
restrictive structural model, we present a number of robustness checks and extensions 
that support our general conclusions about the importance of compositional concerns.   
Importantly, however, we also show that economic concerns explain a very high share of 
the variation in attitudes to a question about whether immigration is “good or bad for the 
economy”.  Respondents appear to distinguish between the conventional economic effects 
of immigration on relative wages and fiscal balances, and the effects on compositional 
amenities, and place a relatively high weight on the compositional effects in deciding 
their views about immigration policy.    32 
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  Table 1:  Distributions of Responses to Summary Views on Immigration 
Panel A: Whether to Allow Many/Some/Few or None of Different Immigrant Groups
          Percentage Distribution of 
Standard   Preferred Share Allowed to Immigrate:
Mean
a Deviation None Few Some Many
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
People from Rich European Countries 2.62 0.85 9.9 32.6 43.3 14.2
People from Poor European Countries 2.57 0.81 9.0 36.8 42.8 11.4
People from Rich non-European Countries 2.53 0.84 11.3 36.2 41.1 11.4
People from Poor non-European Countries 2.49 0.82 10.8 39.0 40.1 10.0
People of the Same Race/Ethnicity as 2.73 0.80 6.3 30.8 47.1 15.8
   the Majority
People of a Different Race/Ethnicity as 2.48 0.82 11.3 38.9 40.0 9.7
   the Majority
Panel B: Overall Assessments of the Effect of Immigration
Standard    Percentage Distribution of Responses: 0-11 Scale
Mean
a Deviation 0-1 2-4 5 6-8 9-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Immigration is Good/Bad for the Economy 4.97 2.36 9.3 25.0 28.1 32.0 5.5
Immigrants Make the Country a Better/Worse 4.77 2.18 8.3 28.1 34.6 24.8 4.3
Place
Notes: sample sizes are 37,405 for the economy question and 37,823 for the country question. Don't know responses are assigned to 
category 5.
Notes: sample size ranges from 37,778 to 38,087 depending on question.  Don't know responses are assigned to "some" 
category.  
aNone response=1, few=2, some=3, many=4.
aMake worse response=0, make better response=10.Table 2: Simple Correlations of Standardized Responses to Views on Immigration
                                         Correlation with Variable Number:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Allow people from rich 1.00
    European countries to come
2. Allow people from poor 0.63 1.00
    European countries to come 0.59
3. Allow people from rich 0.82 0.65 1.00
    non-European countries to come 0.8 0.61
4. Allow people from poor 0.60 0.87 0.68 1.00
    non-European countries to come 0.55 0.84 0.64
5. Allow people of the same 0.61 0.80 0.66 0.81 1.00
    ethnicity to come 0.58 0.77 0.62 0.78
6. Allow people of different 0.64 0.72 0.62 0.69 0.73 1.00
    ethnicity to come 0.6 0.69 0.58 0.65 0.7
7. Immigration is good/bad for 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.37 1.00
    the economy 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.33
8. Immigrants make the country 0.33 0.44 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.57 1.00
    a better/worse place to live 0.26 0.37 0.29 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.53
Note: main entries are unweighted correlations of standardized responses to 8 questions across all respondents in 2002 ESS.  Entries in Italics are adjusted correlations, 
based on residuals from regressions on country dummies and observed covariates. Orginal 4-point or 11-point responses are linearly re-scaled to lie between 0 (most 
negative response) and 1 (most positive).Table 3:  Responses to Indicator Questions and Correlations with Summary Views on Immigration 
Correlation of Indicator with Summary Views
Allow Many/None Immigration Immigrants
Mean of Average of Good or  Make Country
Standardized 4 Country- Bad for the Better/Worse
Response
a Groups Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indicators of Economic Concerns:
Wages are brought down by immigrants 0.49 0.33 0.34 0.35
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
Immigrants harm the prospects of the poor 0.43 0.35 0.37 0.37
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
Immigrants fill jobs where there are shortages 0.63 0.17 0.26 0.19
   (5 point agree/disagree, disagree=0)
Immigrants take away jobs/create jobs 0.45 0.36 0.52 0.47
    (11 point numerical scale, take away=0)
Immigrants take out more/less than they put in 0.42 0.32 0.52 0.45
    (11 point numerical scale; take out more=0)
Indicators of Compositional Amenity Concerns:
It is better to have common customs/traditions 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.35
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
It is better to have a variety of religions 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.29
   (5 point agree/disagree, disagree=0)
It is better to have a common language 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.12
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
Immigrants undermine/enrich cultural life 0.58 0.42 0.56 0.61
    (11 point numerical scale; undermine=0)
Stop immigration to reduce social tensions 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.45
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
Extra indicator:
Immigrants make crime worse/better 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.45
    (11 point numerical scale; worse=0)
Indicators of Altruistic Concerns:
Immigration has good/bad effect on sending country 0.44 -0.02 0.05 0.03
    (11 point numerical scale; bad effect=0)
Rich countries have a responsibility to accept imms. 0.60 0.23 0.20 0.24
   (5 point agree/disagree, disagree=0)
All countries benefit from free mobility 0.68 0.14 0.14 0.12
   (5 point agree/disagree; agree=0)
Notes: sample sizes range from 37,244 to 39,149.  Entries in columns 2-4 are correlations of standardized indicator with 
standardized responses to views on immigration (also scaled between 0 and 1).
aOriginal 5 point or 11 point responses are linearly rescaled to lie between 0 (most negative response) and 1 (most positive).Table 4: Summary of Estimates from Baseline Model
                     Dependent Variable (y):
Allow Many/None Immigration Immigrants
(Average of Good or  Make Country
4 Country- Bad for the Better/Worse
Groups) Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (3)
1. Estimates of λ:
  a. λ1 = effect of economic concerns on y 0.025 0.120 0.047
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  b. λ2 = effect of compositional concerns on y 0.102 0.038 0.100
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2. Correlation of economic/compositional factors 0.784 0.784 0.784
3. Decomposition of Age Gap (old vs. young)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.070 -0.020 -0.043
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.006 -0.026 -0.010
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.048 -0.018 -0.048
4. Decomposition of Education Gap (tertiary vs. primary)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.131 0.120 0.098
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.019 0.088 0.034
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.094 0.035 0.092
5. Decomposition of Unemp. Gap (unemp. vs. employed)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.029 -0.035 -0.029
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.009 -0.040 -0.016
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.015 -0.005 -0.014
6. Decomposition of Urban Gap (large city vs. rural)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.026 0.028 0.022
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.002 0.011 0.004
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.020 0.008 0.020
Notes: estimated by minimim distance on reduced form coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix 
(see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.Table 5:  Explaining Variation in Attitudes toward Different Potential Immigrant Groups
       Estimates of λ:       Age Gap: (old v. young) Education Gap (tertiary v. primary)
Economic  Composition       Explained by:        Explained by: 
λ1 λ2    Actual Economic Composition    Actual Economic Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
By Country of Origin:
 Average of 4 Country Groups 0.025 0.102 -0.070 -0.006 -0.048 0.131 0.019 0.094
(0.004) (0.004) 8.6% 68.6% 14.5% 71.9%
 People from Rich  0.028 0.079 -0.050 -0.006 -0.038 0.147 0.020 0.073
    European Countries (0.004) (0.004) 12.0% 76.0% 13.6% 49.7%
  People from Poor 0.029 0.111 -0.080 -0.006 -0.053 0.116 0.021 0.102
    European Countries (0.004) (0.004) 7.5% 66.3% 18.1% 87.9%
  People from Rich  0.022 0.095 -0.063 -0.005 -0.045 0.144 0.016 0.087
    non-European Countries (0.004) (0.004) 7.9% 71.4% 11.1% 60.4%
  People from Poor 0.023 0.124 -0.089 -0.005 -0.059 0.116 0.017 0.113
    non-European Countries (0.004) (0.004) 5.6% 66.3% 14.7% 97.4%
By Ethnicity:
   People of Same Ethnicity 0.035 0.085 -0.067 -0.008 -0.040 0.129 0.025 0.078
(0.004) (0.004) 11.9% 59.7% 19.4% 60.5%
  People of Different Ethnicity 0.014 0.135 -0.094 -0.003 -0.064 0.136 0.010 0.123
(0.004) (0.004) 3.2% 68.1% 7.4% 90.4%
Notes: Based on estimates from baseline model summarized in Table 4 with alternative dependent variables.  Dependent variable in each 
row is rescaled response to question of whether many, some, few, or no immigrants from indicated source group should be allowed to come 
to live in the respondent's country.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Percentages below the explained gaps represent shares of the actual 
gap explained by the factor.Table 6a: Summary of Estimates from Variant of Baseline Model (Add Crime as Indicator)
                     Dependent Variable (y):
Allow Many/None Immigration Immigrants
(Average of Good or  Make Country
4 Country- Bad for the Better/Worse
Groups) Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (2)
1. Estimates of λ:
  a. λ1 = effect of economic concerns on y 0.011 0.116 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
  b. λ2 = effect of compositional concerns on y 0.113 0.042 0.133
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
2. Correlation of economic/compositional factors 0.832 0.832 0.832
3. Decomposition of Age Gap (old vs. young)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.070 -0.020 -0.043
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.002 -0.025 -0.002
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.054 -0.020 -0.064
4. Decomposition of Education Gap (tertiary vs. primary)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.131 0.120 0.098
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.008 0.086 0.011
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.098 0.036 0.115
5. Decomposition of Unemp. Gap (unemp. vs. employed)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.029 -0.035 -0.029
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.004 -0.039 -0.005
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.018 -0.007 -0.021
6. Decomposition of Urban Gap (large city vs. rural)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.026 0.028 0.022
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.001 0.010 0.001
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.022 0.008 0.026
Notes: estimated by minimim distance on reduced form coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix 
(see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.  This variant includes an extra indicator variable for compositional 
concerns, based on whether the respondent thinks immigrants increase crime problems.Table 6b: Summary of Estimates from Variant of Baseline Model (Remove "Fill Jobs" Indicator)
                     Dependent Variable (y):
Allow Many/None Immigration Immigrants
(Average of Good or  Make Country
4 Country- Bad for the Better/Worse
Groups) Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (2)
1. Estimates of λ:
  a. λ1 = effect of economic concerns on y 0.021 0.110 0.044
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
  b. λ2 = effect of compositional concerns on y 0.106 0.047 0.103
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2. Correlation of economic/compositional factors 0.776 0.776 0.776
3. Decomposition of Age Gap (old vs. young)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.070 -0.020 -0.043
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.005 -0.027 -0.011
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.050 -0.022 -0.049
4. Decomposition of Education Gap (tertiary vs. primary)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.131 0.120 0.098
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.016 0.080 0.031
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.097 0.042 0.094
5. Decomposition of Unemp. Gap (unemp. vs. employed)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.029 -0.035 -0.029
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.007 -0.036 -0.014
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.015 -0.007 -0.015
6. Decomposition of Urban Gap (large city vs. rural)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.026 0.028 0.022
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.002 0.009 0.004
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.021 0.009 0.021
Notes: estimated by minimim distance on reduced form coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix 
(see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.  This variant excludes the question on whether immigrants fill 
jobs where there are vacancies as an indicator of economic concerns.Table 7:  Decompositions of Views on Immigration Policy Under Alternative Assumptions on c-coefficients
                       Assumption on c-vector
cj=0 Factor-specific
(baseline) Single c vector c-vector 
(1) (2) (3)
1. Decomposition of Age Gap (old vs. young)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.070 -0.070 -0.070
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.006 -0.010 -0.020
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.048 -0.067 -0.044
2. Decomposition of Education Gap (tertiary vs. primary)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.131 0.131 0.131
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.019 0.026 0.015
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.094 0.122 0.147
3. Decomposition of Unemp. Gap (unemp. vs. employed)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.009 -0.009 -0.006
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.015 -0.015 -0.022
4. Decomposition of Urban Gap (large city vs. rural)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.026 0.026 0.026
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.002 0.002 0.000
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.020 0.019 0.025
Notes: estimated by minimim distance on reduced form coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix 
(see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates of λ1, λ2 , and σ12 are the same as in Table 4.  
Specification in column 1 sets all c-vectors to 0. Specification in column 2 assumes cj=c (a single vector for 
all 10 indicators).  Specification in column 3 assumes cj=c
e for the 5 indicators of economic concerns, and 
cj=c
a for the 5 indicators of compositional concerns (i.e., factor-specific c-vectors).Table 8: Summary of Estimates from Three Factor Model
                     Dependent Variable (y):
Allow Many/None Immigration Immigrants
(Average of Good or  Make Country
4 Country- Bad for the Better/Worse
Groups) Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (2)
1. Estimates of λ:
  a. λ1 = effect of economic concerns on y 0.023 0.122 0.047
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  b. λ2 = effect of compositional concerns on y 0.088 0.034 0.096
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  c. λ3 = effect of altruism concerns on y 0.034 0.005 0.010
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
2. Correlations of 3 factors
    a. correlation of economic/compostion factors 0.787 0.787 0.787
    b. correlation of economic/altruism factors 0.403 0.403 0.403
    c. correlation of altruism/composition factors 0.471 0.471 0.471
3. Decomposition of Age Gap (old vs. young)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.070 -0.020 -0.043
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.005 -0.026 -0.010
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.042 -0.016 -0.045
   d. Gap attributed to altruism concerns 0.005 0.001 0.002
4. Decomposition of Education Gap (tertiary vs. primary)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.131 0.120 0.098
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.017 0.089 0.034
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.081 0.032 0.088
   d. Gap attributed to altruism concerns 0.003 0.001 0.010
5. Decomposition of Unemp. Gap (unemp. vs. employed)
   a. Total estimated gap  -0.029 -0.035 -0.029
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns -0.008 -0.041 -0.016
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns -0.013 -0.005 -0.014
   d. Gap attributed to altruism concerns 0.001 0.000 0.000
6. Decomposition of Urban Gap (large city vs. rural)
   a. Total estimated gap  0.026 0.028 0.022
   b. Gap attributed to economic concerns 0.002 0.012 0.004
   c. Gap attributed to compositional concerns 0.018 0.007 0.019
   d. Gap attributed to altruism concerns 0.002 0.000 0.001
Notes: estimated by minimim distance on reduced form coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix 
(see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.Table 9: Summary of Estimates of Baseline Model, Estimated by Country
       Estimates of λ:        Age Gap: (old v. young)     Education Gap (tertiary v. primary)
Economic Composition                     Explained by:                      Explained by: 
λ1 λ2 Actual Economic Composition Actual Economic Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Austria -0.001 0.109 -0.127 0.000 -0.037 0.129 -0.003 0.142
(0.017) (0.016)
Belgium 0.010 0.120 -0.026 -0.006 -0.112 0.197 0.009 0.167
(0.014) (0.014)
Switzerland 0.007 0.105 -0.081 -0.003 -0.047 0.133 0.005 0.072
(0.012) (0.012)
Czech Republic 0.044 0.094 -0.080 -0.029 -0.083 0.126 0.044 0.090
(0.021) (0.022)
Germany 0.047 0.088 -0.115 -0.034 -0.080 0.126 0.044 0.077
(0.001) (0.011)
Denmark 0.011 0.105 -0.035 -0.002 -0.084 0.173 0.011 0.145
(0.016) (0.015)
Spain -0.012 0.154 -0.024 0.002 -0.069 0.087 -0.006 0.083
(0.021) (0.022)
Finland 0.037 0.093 -0.038 -0.004 -0.034 0.102 0.044 0.148
(0.013) (0.014)
France -0.029 0.156 -0.122 0.009 -0.098 0.144 -0.019 0.141
(0.026) (0.026)
United Kingdom 0.050 0.097 -0.084 0.000 -0.043 0.180 0.066 0.141
(0.013) (0.013)
Greece 0.021 0.089 -0.051 0.005 0.010 0.087 0.015 0.059
(0.021) (0.022)
Hungary 0.038 0.057 -0.025 -0.016 -0.035 0.069 0.032 0.061
(0.016) (0.016)
Ireland 0.043 0.082 -0.040 -0.022 -0.022 0.118 0.057 0.130
(0.015) (0.015)
Italy 0.035 0.113 -0.048 0.013 -0.015 0.169 0.028 0.103
(0.018) (0.018)
Netherlands 0.036 0.078 -0.030 -0.019 -0.065 0.129 0.045 0.115
(0.014) (0.014)
Norway 0.017 0.095 -0.093 0.000 -0.039 0.147 0.023 0.138
(0.013) (0.012)
Poland 0.063 0.053 -0.069 -0.032 -0.047 0.119 0.051 0.045
(0.015) (0.015)
Portugal 0.019 0.126 0.000 0.000 -0.038 0.150 0.012 0.131
(0.026) (0.026)
Sweden 0.022 0.099 -0.041 -0.016 -0.107 0.116 0.033 0.160
(0.014) (0.013)
Slovenia 0.023 0.103 -0.121 -0.026 -0.170 0.116 0.026 0.139
(0.019) (0.019)
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DKAppendix Table 1: Characteristics of 2002 ESS Sample by Country
Sample      Age Distribution (%)       Ethnicity (%)     Empl. Status (%) In Larger     Education (%)
Size Male (%) Under 30 30-54 Over 54 Minority Immigrant Employed Retired City (%) Primary Tertiary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Austria 2,257 46.2 20.0 47.8 32.2 5.7 8.9 55.7 24.8 36.2 31.6 12.7
Belgium 1,899 51.5 28.1 43.4 28.4 2.2 8.3 49.6 17.9 22.8 35.0 13.6
Switzerland 2,040 48.1 16.3 48.6 35.1 4.6 16.9 55.4 17.5 21.1 18.1 16.1
Czech Republic 1,360 47.7 15.9 38.2 45.9 2.2 4.3 46.9 33.5 32.8 15.9 11.1
Germany 2,919 48.2 19.6 45.3 35.1 3.9 7.3 47.0 23.1 33.2 15.5 21.6
Denmark 1,506 50.7 22.0 44.6 33.4 2.5 5.2 59.8 20.4 35.5 24.8 17.2
Spain 1,729 47.3 20.7 40.5 38.8 2.9 4.6 42.3 16.8 30.1 58.7 14.6
Finland 2,000 48.0 26.1 40.6 33.3 1.2 3.2 52.6 24.7 27.9 40.1 24.9
France 1,503 45.2 21.7 42.2 36.1 4.0 10.0 46.7 27.5 36.0 51.7 26.0
United Kingdom 2,052 46.6 18.8 43.1 38.1 6.2 9.3 51.7 24.2 29.5 55.8 23.4
Greece 2,566 43.4 19.4 38.3 42.3 3.7 9.8 40.8 25.2 56.0 57.8 14.0
Hungary 1,685 48.0 24.9 41.4 33.7 5.1 2.4 42.8 22.9 24.9 63.0 13.5
Ireland 2,046 46.1 23.5 43.2 33.4 1.7 7.3 51.6 13.5 32.7 47.0 12.8
Italy 1,207 45.4 22.2 45.1 32.7 1.0 2.2 49.0 18.6 17.6 56.1 8.0
Luxemburg 1,552 47.4 31.8 39.0 29.2 6.8 31.0 40.4 15.9 22.7 46.0 16.7
Netherlands 2,364 44.1 16.0 47.4 36.5 4.2 6.6 46.6 15.3 29.3 42.8 23.3
Norway 2,036 54.2 20.4 48.4 31.2 2.4 6.5 62.6 15.6 35.6 14.9 28.1
Poland 2,110 48.9 32.3 40.8 26.9 2.8 1.5 40.4 23.8 27.4 55.2 14.1
Portugal 1,511 41.7 22.2 39.2 38.6 1.2 6.0 49.8 22.2 41.6 75.1 8.9
Sweden 1,999 50.8 23.3 41.8 34.9 2.9 10.7 58.9 17.1 32.9 47.8 30.6
Slovenia 1,519 47.6 27.8 42.7 29.6 3.0 8.9 39.8 21.0 23.6 30.4 14.1
Notes: unweighted means from 2002 ESS sample. Sample sizes include all valid observations: number of valid responses for specific items vary.  Appendix Table 2: Mean Standardized Responses to Views on Immigration Across Countries
     Allow Many/Some/Few/None of: Immigration Immigrants
Average of People of People of Good or Make Country
4 Country- Same  Different Bad for the Better/Worse
Groups Ethnicity Ethnicity Economy Place to Live
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Countries 0.52 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.48
Austria 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.56 0.47
Belgium 0.53 0.58 0.50 0.46 0.43
Switzerland 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.59 0.53
Czech Republic 0.53 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.42
Germany 0.55 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.48
Denmark 0.56 0.65 0.51 0.48 0.55
Spain 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.47
Finland 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.53 0.53
France 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.45
United Kingdom 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.44 0.46
Greece 0.36 0.42 0.31 0.36 0.34
Hungary 0.35 0.54 0.31 0.41 0.40
Ireland 0.57 0.66 0.56 0.50 0.53
Italy 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.45
Luxemburg 0.50 0.56 0.47 0.68 0.58
Netherlands 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.47
Norway 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.54 0.48
Poland 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.45 0.52
Portugal 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.50 0.39
Sweden 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.55 0.62
Slovenia 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.43 0.45
Notes: Original 4 point or 11 point responses are linearly rescaled to lie between 0 (most negative 
response) and 1 (most positive).  Entries in column 1 are unweighted averages of rescaled 
responses for questions on allowing many/some/few/none people from rich European countries, 
poor European countris, rich non-European countries, and poor non-European countries.Rich European Poor European Rich Overseas
Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture
Age 30-45 -0.019 -0.003 -0.008 -0.040 -0.003 -0.011 -0.019 -0.002 -0.009
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 45-60 -0.033 -0.003 -0.018 -0.054 -0.003 -0.025 -0.042 -0.002 -0.021
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 60+ -0.0497 -0.006 -0.038 -0.080 -0.006 -0.053 -0.063 -0.005 -0.045
(0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 0.033 0.000 -0.007 -0.004 0.000 -0.010 0.023 0.000 -0.009
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Low Education -0.048 -0.006 -0.024 -0.033 -0.007 -0.034 -0.048 -0.005 -0.029
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
High Education 0.099 0.014 0.048 0.084 0.015 0.068 0.096 0.011 0.058
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.032 -0.009 -0.011 -0.033 -0.010 -0.016 -0.023 -0.008 -0.014
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Inactive 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.018 -0.001 -0.006 -0.019 -0.001 -0.008 0.019 0.000 -0.007
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.053 0.013 0.029 0.054 0.014 0.040 0.046 0.011 0.035
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Minority 0.012 0.005 0.019 0.019 0.005 0.027 0.008 0.004 0.023
(0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001)
City 0.035 0.003 0.016 0.017 0.003 0.022 0.031 0.002 0.019
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Town 0.018 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.011 0.016 0.002 0.009
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Appendix Table 3a: Decomposition of coefficients of observed characteristics across channels
Notes: estimated by minimum distance on reduced from coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix (see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.Appendix Table 3b: Decomposition of coefficients of observed characteristics across channels
Poor Overseas Different Ethnicity Same Ethnicity
Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture
Age 30-45 -0.037 -0.002 -0.012 -0.039 -0.002 -0.013 -0.034 -0.004 -0.008
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 45-60 -0.059 -0.002 -0.028 -0.060 -0.002 -0.030 -0.044 -0.004 -0.019
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 60+ -0.088 -0.005 -0.059 -0.094 -0.003 -0.064 -0.067 -0.008 -0.040
(0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002)
Male -0.010 0.000 -0.012 -0.003 0.000 -0.013 0.011 0.000 -0.008
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Low Education -0.033 -0.005 -0.038 -0.041 -0.003 -0.041 -0.042 -0.008 -0.026
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
High Education 0.083 0.011 0.076 0.095 0.007 0.082 0.087 0.017 0.052
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.029 -0.008 -0.018 -0.026 -0.005 -0.019 -0.028 -0.012 -0.012
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Inactive 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.012 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.016 0.000 -0.009 -0.014 0.000 -0.010 -0.012 -0.001 -0.006
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.051 0.011 0.045 0.052 0.007 0.049 0.049 0.017 0.031
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Minority 0.022 0.004 0.030 0.023 0.003 0.033 -0.001 0.006 0.021
(0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001)
City 0.022 0.002 0.025 0.027 0.001 0.027 0.020 0.003 0.017
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Town 0.013 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.011 0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: estimated by minimum distance on reduced from coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix (see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.Appendix Table 3c: Decomposition of coefficients of observed characteristics across channels
Good or Bad for the Economy Worse or better place to live Allow Many/None (Average of 4 Country Groups)
Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture Total Effect Economy Culture
Age 30-45 -0.010 -0.013 -0.004 -0.015 -0.005 -0.010 -0.029 -0.003 -0.010
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Age 45-60 -0.001 -0.012 -0.009 -0.022 -0.005 -0.022 -0.047 -0.003 -0.023
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Age 60+ -0.020 -0.026 -0.018 -0.043 -0.010 -0.048 -0.070 -0.006 -0.048
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.0008) (0.001)
Male 0.031 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.009 0.010 0.000 -0.010
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Low Education -0.042 -0.028 -0.012 -0.031 -0.011 -0.031 -0.041 -0.006 -0.031
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.001)
High Education 0.078 0.060 0.023 0.067 0.023 0.061 0.090 0.013 0.062
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.035 -0.040 -0.005 -0.029 -0.016 -0.014 -0.029 -0.009 -0.015
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
Inactive 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Retired 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.018 0.000 -0.008
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.005) (0.0002) (0.0008)
Immigrant 0.070 0.058 0.014 0.079 0.023 0.037 0.051 0.012 0.037
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Minority 0.029 0.022 0.009 0.032 0.009 0.024 0.015 0.005 0.025
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.0007) (0.001)
City 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.022 0.004 0.020 0.026 0.002 0.020
(0.003) (0.000) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Town 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.014 0.002 0.010
(0.003) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Notes: estimated by minimum distance on reduced from coefficients and residual variance-covariance matrix (see text).  Standard errors in parentheses.Appendix A: Estimation Procedures and Identification 
 
In this section we explain in detail how we estimate the parameters of the model. We 
introduce matrix algebra notation to simplify notation and allow for an arbitrary number 
of channels. 
Let y be the 1×N vector of policy responses, z be the q×N matrix of underlying opinions, 
Xbe the k×N matrix of covariates and f be the p×N matrix of underlying factors. Let  
µ , v and ω be 1×N, q×N and p×N matrices of residuals.  Model parameters then include 
a 1×p vector Λ, a 1×k vector α , a q×p matrix M, a q×k matrix C and a 1×p matrix B 
such that 
 
(A-1)  µ α + + Λ = X f y  
(A-2)  ν CX Mf z + + =  
(A-3)  ω BX f + =  
Equation (A-1) corresponds to equation (2), where we have combined  1 λ and  2 λ to form 
the vector Λand generalized to allow for p channels. Equations (A-2) and (A-3) 
corresponds to equations (3-a), (3-b) and (4-a), (4-b) where we have again combined 

























M . To form the reduced form equations (corresponding to equations (5-a) and (5-b) in the 
text) , we substitute (A-3) into (A-1) and (A-2) to obtain: 
(A-5)  0 0 ) ( ) ( ε µ α + Γ = Λ + + + Λ = X ω X B y  
(A-6)  1 1 ε X Γ ) M (ν C)X (MB z + = + + + = ω  












 with  () εε' Ω E = . 
Stage 1: Estimating the reduced form 
 
We begin by estimating the reduced form coefficients by standard multivariate linear 
regression to form estimates 
1
0 ˆ − = Γ ) (XX' X' y  and 
1 ˆ − = ) (XX' zX' Γ1 . This allows us to 
condition out the effects of the variables collected in X, and work with the reduced form 















, where  ) ( ˆ0 X ) (XX' X' I
1 − − = y ε =P P 0 ε = y and 
P ε zP X) ) (XX' X' z(I ε 1
1
1 = = − =
− ˆ . The variance-covariance matrix Ωis consistently 
estimated by  ' ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ ε ε Ω
k N −













Asymptotically the estimates are distributed as 















































where Qis an appropriately defined matrix of fourth order moments.   
Stage 2: Estimating the Loading Matrix Μ and the Channel weightings Λ 
 
We assume that (in accordance with equations (6-a), (6-b) and (6-c))  ω v   and   , µ are 



































































































We choose to estimate  φ , Σ , M ˆ ˆ ˆ  by equally weighted minimum distance.  That is to say 
we set the free parameters of   φ , Σ , M ˆ ˆ ˆ  to solve 
(A-10)  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )' ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( min 22 22 Ω φ ' M Σ M Ω φ ' M Σ M − + − + v v   
where v(.) denotes the operator eliminating the supradiagonal elements from the 
vectorisation of the argument (applied to avoid duplication of the off-diagonal moment 
conditions). 
Vectorising and totally differentiating the moment conditions 
gives φ Σ M) (M M ] K MΣ I I MΣ Ω q q 22    vec d      vec d      vec d   ) ( ) [(    vec d   + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ = qq  
φ I Σ G M G dvec dvec   dvec   2 q M + + = Σ where  qq K is an appropriate commutation matrix 



















)   vec ( Var
ˆ   vec
ˆ vec





















1 1 1 1 ) G ' (G G G
− + =  is the Moore-Penrose inverse. 
 
Having obtained estimates of  Σ M   and   , we now estimate Λby 
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − + = Σ M Ω12 Λ  where 
1 ) M ' M ( M M
− + = ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , which amounts again to applying equally weighted minimum 





1 Σ   M Ω I M Ω   Σ Ω   M Σ  
− + + − + − ⊗ + ⊗ + = = ˆ  vec d ] ˆ [   ˆ    vec d ] ˆ ˆ [ ˆ  vec d ] ' ˆ ˆ [ ' ˆ d ˆ  vec d Λ Λ , 
from which, using standard formulae for differentials of inverses, we can form an 
expression of the form  Σ H M H Ω H Σ M 12 12 ˆ    vec d      vec d ˆ    vec d ' ˆ   d + + = Λ for appropriate 
Σ M 12 H H H   and   , . 



































where  12 J  and  22 J  pick out the elements  of  12 Ω  and  22 Ω  in  Ω   vec ,   
(A-12)  2 1 1 2 H Ω)H ' H ' H vec ( Var ) ' ˆ ( Var = Λ .  
Stage 3: De-composing Γ0 across the channels 
 
Consider firstly the case where we assume that  0 = C . Then we estimate B by 
1 Γ M B ˆ ' ˆ + =
)
 and 1 k P 1 Γ   M I M )K I ' Γ B
) )
 vec d ) ' ( ˆ    vec d ˆ ( ˆ    vec d
+ + ⊗ + ⊗ = qp  
1 r M Γ F M F    vec d ˆ    vec d + =  for appropriate  r M F F   and   . 
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F where  1 J  picks out the 









Λ ˆ   vec
ˆ   vec
Var
B
= 2 1 1 2 F VF ' F ' F   























B  and  ) ( , 2 , 1 p λ λ λ L = Λ then  ∑ + = + =
i i iB λ Λ Γ α α B 0  which is the basis 
for decomposing  0 ˆ Γ  into contributions through the p channels,  i iB ˆ ˆ λ  for i=1,…p, and 
also for estimating α. Furthermore  ( ) i i i i i i B B B ˆ ˆ   d ˆ   d ˆ ˆ ˆ   d λ λ λ + =  from which standard errors 
on the components of the decomposition can easily be calculated given the formula above 
for the joint distribution of B ˆ and Λ ˆ . We can relax the assumption  0 C = . Suppose, say, that  ec = C where e is a q×1 vector of 
ones and c  is a 1×k row vector of elements to be estimated. Then B and c are jointly 













We can weaken this even further by keeping  ec C =  but generalizing e to a (q×p) matrix 













































c  . 
 
 Standard errors are calculated in line with the procedure described earlier for the simpler 
case. 
 